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This study focuses on the relation between the risk profile of a hedge fund and its 
probability to fail. We propose to model the failure event using survival analysis 
through a Cox Hazards Model while incorporating piecewise effects in the risk 
covariate. Empirical results suggest that there has been a shift in the relationship 
between the risk profile of a hedge fund and its probability of failure. For the period 
between 1995 and 2006, larger risk was associated with higher probability of failure 
whereas since 2007, increasing risk levels reduce the risk of failure of hedge funds. We 
are the first to show this effect and use this model in Hedge Funds literature. These 
findings allow investors to better understand the dynamics of risk and probability to fail 
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The present study proposes to examine whether the relation between the level of risk of 
a hedge fund and its probability of failing has always been positive throughout time. 
Implementation of new regulations, changes in market dynamics, and several other 
exogenous factors could potentially affect the relation between risk and the probability 
for a fund to fail. Was the riskier fund always the most likely to fail? Empirical 
evidence presented in this study suggests that the dynamics between risk and failure has 
inverted. Before 2007 there was a positive relation between the level of risk taken by a 
hedge fund and its probability of failure, since then this relation became negative.  
Hedge funds have a dynamic role on the financial markets. In the chasing game for 
mispriced assets and market anomalies, these pools of money tend to be the first to get 
to the finish line and profit out of the misalignments that are present in the financial 
markets. As a result, hedge funds can promote rapid changes in asset prices due to the 
tendency for other market agents to follow their lead as well as due to the relative 
volume of the transactions these players execute (Eichengreen et al. 1998). The case of 
the Long Term Capital Management (LTCM), which ended up being rescued by the 
Federal Reserve, is a good example of how hedge funds can drastically influence the 
course of the financial markets. In the words of Edwards (1999): If the misadventures of 
a single wayward hedge fund with only about $4.8 billion in equity at the start of 1998 
could take … the world economy so close to the precipice of financial disaster … what 
might happen if a number of hedge funds got into trouble?. For this reason, 
understanding the conditions that influence hedge fund failures is far from being a 
problem that only concerns those whose money is in the hands of these market agents. 
In a parallel to the turmoil of 1998, funds as a whole lost twice as much during the 
Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2009 than in 1998, their second worst performing 
period (Kaiser and Haberfelner 2011). Hedge funds drastically changed their portfolio 
allocation during the Global Financial Crisis. Ben-David, Franzoni and Moussawi 
(2012) find that in the second half of 2008 hedge funds decreased their aggregate 
portfolio in equity holdings by more than 25%. Changes in portfolio allocations were 
largely due to the fact that during the Global Financial Crisis hedge funds were 
experiencing serious financial constraints that forced them to reduce their leverage. In 




than low-volatility stocks were sold by hedge funds due to the fact that high-volatility 
positions required higher margins from hedge funds. Thus, there is evidence that funds 
that were faced with financial constraints attempted to decrease their risk profile. In 
light of these changes in the market dynamics of hedge funds during the Global 
Financial Crisis, this study examines whether lower risk levels effectively translated 
into a decrease in the probability for a fund to fail during that period. 
The present study performs a survival analysis in order to examine the risk of failure of 
hedge funds and models this event with the use of the Cox Model. A survival analysis 
consists of examining the time between the entry of an individual into a study and a 
certain event. In this case, the individual is the hedge fund and the event under analysis 
is its failure. The Cox Model is a parametric tool that models the risk of failure of hedge 
funds according to a set of characteristics that are believed to have an influence on the 
event of failure. The set of measures or characteristics that are used to model the risk of 
failure are called covariates; either time-varying or fixed covariates, depending on 
whether they vary across time or not. In this study, all of the time-varying covariates are 
analysed on a monthly basis. 
One major aspect to take into consideration when performing a survival analysis on 
hedge funds is defining which conditions define the failure event. This study considers 
two methods in order to categorize a fund as a failure. (i) One of them consists in 
considering a failure whenever the hedge fund stops reporting to the respective 
database. Nonetheless, hedge funds may choose to stop reporting to any of the databases 
at any point in time, for various reasons other than failure. For example, Liang and Park 
(2010) argue that a fund that exits the database due to liquidation could have done so in 
an antecipation to downward movements in the market environment that could have 
generated potential losses for the fund, thus it should not be considered a failure. 
Aditionally, Haghani (2014) also argues that a sucessful hedge fund could stop 
reporting after being merged with another fund due to its growth potential. Therefore, in 
order to control for this sort of selection bias, (ii) an alternative method considers a fund 
as a Real failure whenever it fulfils the following three conditions: the fund has ceased 
to report to the database, has negative average rates of return in the last 6 months and 
decreasing assets under management in the last 12 months. The advantage of this 
alternative method in relation to the first one is that it takes into account the evolution of 
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the size and performance of the fund in its last reporting months in order to determine 
whether it really failed.  
Another major aspect to take into account when performing a survival analysis on hedge 
funds is understanding which characteristics influence the failure event. In light of this, 
numerous authors have examined different models that attempt to predict this event 
taking into account a set of covariates. Grecu, Malkiel and Saha (2007) perform a 
survival analysis with the Cox and the Log-logistic models in order to examine the 
reasons that lead a fund to stop reporting and find empirical evidence that refutes the 
hypothesis that hedge funds cease to report due to success rather than failure. Baba and 
Goko (2009) also perform a survival analysis and find that funds with higher returns 
and assets under management have higher survival probabilities. Additionally, they also 
find that funds with a high water mark are more likely to survive. On the other hand, 
Gregoriou (2002) performs a survival analysis of hedge funds using multiple survival 
models and finds, among other things, that funds with less leverage have a higher 
survival probability. Lee and Kim (2014) develop a survival analysis model to predict 
hedge fund failure in crisis-prone financial markets. Additionally, the article of Liang 
and Park (2010) has a different take on this matter as it focuses essentially on the risk 
profile of hedge funds as one of the covariates that can predict hedge fund failure. They 
examine the explanatory power of different risk measures in predicting hedge fund 
failure, while controlling for other covariates. During the period analysed in their study, 
they found that downside risk measures (i.e., value at risk, expected shortfall and tail 
risk) have a superior explanatory power in predicting hedge fund failure in comparison 
to the traditional risk measures (i.e., standard deviation and semi deviation).1 For 
example, according to their results, it is possible to infer that there is a positive and 
significant relation between the expected shortfall of a hedge fund and its likelihood to 
fail. In other words, the higher the risk profile of a hedge fund the more likely it is for it 
to fail.  
The present study performs a survival analysis for predicting hedge fund failure with the 
same set of fixed- and time-varying covariates as the article of Liang and Park (2010). 
However, unlike most traditional articles, the present study introduces an innovative 
model that considers piecewise effects with one breakpoint in 2007 for the risk 
                                                 





covariate. The use of a regression with piecewise effects is a method that considers one 
or more breakpoints for a certain covariate in order to assess the existence of a change 
in the relationship between that covariate and the dependent variable of the model. This 
way, the model presented in this study assesses whether there has been a shift in the 
relation between the risk profile of a hedge fund and its probability of failure at a certain 
point in time. Although several authors have already used regressions with breakpoints 
in previous finance and economic articles, none of the previous hedge fund literature 
has ever implemented a survival analysis with piecewise effects. Lettau and 
Nieuwerburgh (2008) introduce the use of a model that aims to predict stock returns 
using financial ratios as independent variables that are adjusted for shifts across time. 
Rapach and Wohar (2006) also study predictive regression models for stock returns 
introducing breakpoints across time in order to examine changes in the post-war era. 
Bai (1997) examines the existence of breakpoints in time series data for multiple 
regression models in an attempt to analyse the response of market interest rates to 
discount rate changes. For all of these studies, the main idea is that the assumption that 
a certain relation stays constant throughout time is challenged in an attempt to find 
empirical evidence that a shift has occurred somewhere in time. Therefore, the present 
study provides the necessary tools to infer whether there has been a shift in the relation 
between the probability of failure of hedge funds and its risk profile in 2007.  
In summary, the major contribution of this study to the existing hedge fund literature is 
that it introduces an innovative model for predicting hedge fund failure that considers 
piecewise effects for the risk covariate depending on the time period under analysis. 
Consequently, this study finds that during the period between 1995 and 2006, results 
converge with most of the previous literature, indicating that there has been a positive 
and significant relation between the level of risk of a fund and its probability of failing. 
Nonetheless, from 2007 onwards, the present study finds strong empirical evidence that 
this relation became negative and statistically significant. 
This study is organized as follows. Section B describes the hedge fund dataset. Section 
C provides the methodology behind the calculation of the risk measures and the process 
of modelling the risk of failure of hedge funds. Section D presents the main findings. To 
end, Section E concludes. 
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B. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
1. TASS Database 
This study uses data from the Lipper TASS database (TASS database). This database 
along with the hedge Fund Research (HFR) and the Center for International Securities 
and Derivatives Markets (CISDM) are among the most used in the hedge fund 
literature.2 
The TASS database is composed by the active and the graveyard fund files. Once a fund 
stops reporting to the TASS database it is moved to the graveyard. The reasons for 
which funds stop reporting to the Lipper TASS database are the following: “Fund 
Liquidated”, “Fund no longer reporting”, “Unable to contact fund”, “Fund closed to 
new investment”, “Fund has merged into another entity”, “Programme closed”, “Fund 
Dormant” or “Unknown”. As of April 2013, there were 6,786 active funds and 12,238 
graveyard funds in the TASS database. 
The TASS database provides information about the historical Rates-of-Return (RoR) 
that were reported by each fund (and whether they are net-of-fees) as well as their assets 
under management (AuM) in each month or quarter (depending on the reporting 
frequency). It also reports whether the fund has a high water mark (HWM), a lockup 
period (Lockup), whether fund managers have personal capital invested in the fund 
(Personal Capital), if the fund is leveraged or not (Leveraged), among several other 
details. It is important to clarify that whenever funds have a HWM, hedge fund 
managers only receive a performance fee if there is an increase in the value of the fund 
that is greater than its previous maximum. For example, if a fund has suffered a large 
loss, the manager will only receive a performance fee if he or she is able to increase the 
value of the fund above its prior highest value. Panageas and Westerfield (2009) state 
that these performance fees can range from 15% up to 50% of the net value increase. 
Furthermore, if funds have a lockup period investors are not able to remove their capital 
from the fund for a specific time interval. Liang (1999) find that the lockup period of 
hedge funds is on average 84 days. 
                                                 
2 The TASS database is used by Liang and Park (2010), Haghani (2014), Baba and Goko (2009) and 
Grecu, Malkiel and Saha (2007). The HFR database is used by the articles of Lee and Kim (2014) and Ng 
(2009). The CISDM database is used by the article of Gregoriou (2002). 
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The investment style of the fund is also another characteristic that is provided by the 
TASS database. The investment styles that are present in this analysis are the following: 
Convertible Arbitrage, Dedicated Short/Bias, Equity Market Neutral, Event Driven, 
Fixed Income Arbitrage, Global Macro, Long/Short Equity Hedge and Multi-
Strategies.3 Accordingly to the article of Liang and Park (2010); Funds-of-Funds are 
excluded from the analysis in order to avoid for double counting (since this type of 
funds tends to invest in other hedge funds) and Emerging Market funds are also 
excluded so that the highest risk category in each period is not dominated by this 
investment style. Moreover, Liang (2004) argues that convertible trading advisors 
(which are responsible for the trading of Managed Futures) differ from hedge funds in 
their trading strategies, liquidity and correlation structures. For this reason, Managed 
Futures are also excluded from this analysis.  
The time period for which the historical performance of hedge funds is analysed in this 
study goes from January 1995 to April 2013. The reason for choosing this start date has 
to do with the fact that until 1994 the TASS database did not preserve information in the 
graveyard regarding funds that dropped out of the active fund database. The 
survivorship bias of this dataset is reduced since this analysis considers funds that are in 
the active and graveyard databases. 
In order to filter the data accordingly to the article of Liang and Park (2010), funds that 
did not report returns in US Dollars, had a quarterly reporting frequency (instead of 
monthly) and reported gross returns (instead of net-of-fee returns) were excluded from 
this analysis. Furthermore, in an attempt to reduce the instant history bias, funds that did 
not have at least 24 months of historical performance were removed from the dataset. 
Finally, this analysis considers only funds that were incepted from January 1995 
onwards in order to ensure that the full lifetime historical performance of the fund is 
included in the dataset. 
                                                 
3 Convertible Arbitrage focuses on profiting out of the pricing anomalies between a convertible security 
and the underlying common stock. Dedicated Short/Bias consists of a strategy that is mainly aiming to 
profit out of short positions. Equity Market Neutral is concerned about specific investment opportunities 
while hedging against broad market factors. Event Driven strategies exploit the mispricing of stocks due 
to corporate events. Fixed Income Arbitrage profits out of the pricing misalignments of bonds and other 
fixed income securities. Global Macro aims to profit out of worldwide economic and political 
developments. Long/Short Equity Hedge focuses on profiting out of the winners and losers by taking long 
and short positions accordingly. Multi-Strategy funds invest accordingly to a multitude of investment 
styles. 
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By complying with all of the previously mentioned criteria, the dataset of funds is 
composed altogether by 3,165 funds; 737 of which are active and 2,438 that are in the 
graveyard.  
 
2. Failure Criteria 
In this study there are two different methods that are used in order to categorize a fund 
as a failure. The purpose of considering an alternative failure method has to do with the 
fact that hedge funds may stop reporting for a variety of reasons other than failure as 
mentioned by the articles of Liang and Park (2010) and Haghani (2014). 
The two failure method considered were the following: 
a)  The first method considers a fund as a failure whenever it moves to the 
graveyard, according to the TASS database. This means that whenever a fund 
ceases to report to the TASS database (for any of the drop reasons) it is 
considered a failure (hereafter, a fund categorized as failure according to this 
method is called a Drop reason failure). 
 
b)  The second method uses as a failure criteria whether a fund satisfies 
simultaneously a set of conditions. This criteria was set accordingly to the article 
of Liang and Park (2010) which also uses this method in order to distinguish 
between a fund that ceased to report to the TASS database and a real failure 
(hereafter, a fund categorized as failure according to this method is called a Real 
failure). The three conditions it has to fulfil are the following:  
1)  ceases to report to the TASS database; 
2)  has a negative average RoR in the last 6 months; 
3)  has decreased the amount of AuM in the last 12 months. 
Among the 2,438 funds that have ceased to report to the TASS database, 724 are 
considered a Real failure.  
Taking into account the dataset of hedge funds that is used in this analysis, Table 1 and 
Figure 1 provide information about the number of hedge funds that fulfil each of the 
two failure criteria and how does the number of hedge funds in this dataset progresses 
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throughout the time period between January 1995 and April 2013. In order to measure 
the rates at which funds fail every year according to the Drop reason and Real failure 
criteria, the study introduces the attrition and real failure rates, respectively. The 
formula for the attrition and real failure rates depend on which of the corresponding 
failure criteria is considered. These rates stand for the division between the number of 
funds that fulfil the corresponding failure criteria during year t and the number of 






Hedge Fund Attrition Rates 
The table provides the number of hedge funds existent at the beginning of the year (Year Start), 
number of incepted hedge funds (Entry), number of hedge funds that fulfil the Drop reason 
failure criteria (Drop reason failure), number of hedge funds that fulfil the Real failure criteria 
(Real failure) and the total number of hedge funds at the end of the year according to the drop 
reason failure (Year End). The table also provides the attrition and real failure rates according to 
the corresponding failure criteria. There are no hedge fund failures during the years of 1995 and 
1996 due to the selection criteria that were used in this dataset (see Section B.1 for further 
details). There are no failure rates in 2013 as it is not a full year and the data ends in April 2013.  
Year 
 
 Year Start Entry 
Drop reason 
failure 





1995  0 121 - - 121  - - 
1996  121 176 - - 297  - - 
1997  297 179 2 0 474  0.7% 0% 
1998  474 190 11 3 653  2.3% 0.6% 
1999  653 232 16 3 869  2.5% 0.5% 
2000  869 229 51 18 1,047  5.9% 2.1% 
2001  1,047 262 59 20 1,250  5.6% 1.9% 
2002  1,250 289 60 22 1,479  4.8% 1.8% 
2003  1,479 270 119 32 1,630  8.0% 2.2% 
2004  1,630 274 98 29 1,806  6.0% 1.8% 
2005  1,806 311 171 34 1,946  9.5% 1.9% 
2006  1,946 196 246 37 1,896  12.6% 1.9% 
2007  1,896 154 287 42 1,763  15.1% 2.2% 
2008  1,763 135 355 142 1,543  20.1% 8.1% 
2009  1,543 70 295 134 1,318  19.1% 8.7% 
2010  1,318 54 174 55 1,198  13.2% 4.2% 
2011  1,198 23 235 67 986  19.6% 5.6% 
2012  986 0 188 77 798  19.1% 7.8% 
2013  798 0 61 9 737  - - 




Hedge Fund Evolution by Year 
The figure displays the number of hedge funds at the end of the year in the grey columns. The 
dotted and solid lines represent the failure rates according to the Drop reason and Real failure 
criteria, respectively. The data was extracted from the TASS database for the time period of 
January 1995 to April 2013. 
 
 
According to Figure 1 it is possible to see that the number of hedge funds in the dataset 
was the highest in 2005 and started to decrease from then onwards. The attrition rate of 
hedge funds reached its peak in 2008. Moreover, the average annual attrition rate for 
this dataset is 10.1%.4 Haghani (2014) and Xu, Liu and Loviscek (2011) find similar 
results; they report average annual attrition rates of 11.5% and 12.1%, respectively, and 
the highest rate is observed in 2008 as well. 5 
As it was already expected the real failure rates are significantly lower relatively to the 
attrition rates. The average annual real failure rate is 3.2%.4 It is also possible to infer 
from Figure 1 that the real failure rate notably increases from 2007 onwards. This 
finding converges with the article of Kaiser and Haberfelner (2011) pointing out that 
there was an upsurge in the attrition rate of hedge funds due to the Global Financial 
Crisis. 
Furthermore, it is also important to mention that in the period between 2004 and 2007, 
the attrition rates of hedge funds grew much more than the corresponding real failure 
                                                 
4 The average annual attrition and real failure rates do not include the year of 2013 as it is not a full year 
and ends on April 2013. It does not include the years of 1995 and 1996 due to the fact that according to 
the criteria applied to this dataset it is not possible to have failures during these years (see Section B.1 for 
further details). 
5 The time period under analysis for the articles of Haghani (2014) and Xu, Liu and Loviscek (2011) is 
January 1994 to December 2009. 
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rates. As Liang and Park (2010) mention, funds may choose to close their activity in an 
anticipation to downward market movements, which does not necessarily mean that a 
failure event has occurred. Bearing this in mind, one hypothesis that could explain this 
divergence between the growths of these two rates may have to do with the fact that 
during the 3 years before 2007 several hedge funds were able to anticipate the 
downward market period that was soon to arrive due to the Global Financial Crisis. 
Therefore, although there was an upsurge in the number of fund that ceased to report to 
the TASS database between 2004 and 2007, the rate at which funds fulfilled the Real 
failure criteria remained relatively steady for that time period. 
 
3. Hedge Funds by Status 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics about hedge funds’ rates of return grouped in 
accordance to the Drop reason and Real failure criteria in Panels A and B, respectively. 
Regarding Panel A, the average rate of return for active funds is 0.83%, outperforming 
the one for Drop reason funds which is 0.69% (the difference between the two rates is 
statistically significant for a 1% level). These findings show that the performance of 
hedge funds differs between failed and active funds.  Besides, it is also important to 
mention that on average the standard deviation of Drop reason funds is lower than the 
one from active funds. Such results challenge the findings of Liang (2000) and Liang 
and Park (2010) which report that Drop reason funds have on average a higher standard 
deviation than active funds. However, a more recent article from Haghani (2014) shows 
that the standard deviation of Drop reason funds is on average higher than the one from 
active funds. Furthermore, Panel A of Table 2 shows that funds that ceased to report for 
unknown reasons present the highest average RoR among failed funds. Meanwhile, 
funds whose reported drop reason is “Closed” have the lowest average RoR. 
As expected, Panel B of Table 2 shows that the Real failure funds present the lowest 
mean return as well as the highest standard deviation. On the other hand, funds that are 
not losers have the highest mean return and the lowest standard deviation.  
Across all of the categories considered in both panels of Table 2, funds present on 
average a left-skewed and leptokurtic distribution of returns which goes in line with the 
findings of Liang and Park (2010). Furthermore, by performing the Jarque Bera (JB) 
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test for normality, it is possible to infer that more than half of the funds under analysis 




Descriptive Statistics of Hedge Fund Returns by Status 
The table provides the number of hedge funds (N) and the mean and median for the sample 
average, standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis and maximum and minimum returns for the 
lifetime period of each hedge fund. The table also shows the percentage of hedge funds that 
reject the Jarque-Bera (JB) test for normality for a 1% significance level. The values are all in 
percentage terms except for skewness and kurtosis. Panel A is grouped into active and Drop 
reason hedge funds and sub grouped according to each of the drop reasons. Panel B is grouped 
according to the Real Failure method; “Loser” are all funds that had negative average RoR in 
the last 6 months and decreasing AuM in the last 12 months. “Looser but not real failure” are 
losers that did not cease to report to the TASS database. On the other hand, “Real Failure” are 
all funds that are losers and ceased reporting to the database, thus fulfilling the three Real failure 
conditions. 















































































All Funds 3,165 0.73 0.65 3.96 3.07 -0.17 -0.11 7.58 5.15 -11 -8 13 9 61 
Active Funds 737 0.83 0.77 4.01 3.24 -0.14 -0.17 7.75 5.56 -12 -11 14 10 69 
Drop Reason Funds 2,428 0.69 0.61 3.95 2.99 -0.17 -0.10 7.53 5.06 -11 -8 12 8 58 
(Liquidation) 1,044 0.49 0.48 3.70 2.89 -0.24 -0.15 6.78 4.83 -11 -8 11 8 55 
(Not reporting) 683 0.83 0.72 4.22 3.08 -0.13 -0.06 8.33 5.07 -12 -8 13 9 59 
(Unable to Contact) 557 0.87 0.73 4.19 3.27 -0.15 -0.03 8.19 5.34 -12 -9 14 9 64 
(Closed to New 
Investment) 
29 0.85 0.78 3.42 3.05 -0.23 -0.29 6.14 5.18 -9 -9 11 7 66 
(Merged) 45 0.73 0.59 3.95 2.71 -0.05 -0.13 7.07 5.40 -11 -7 15 7 56 
(Closed) 12 0.43 0.24 3.31 2.69 -0.70 -0.76 5.62 4.82 -10 -8 8 7 50 
(Dormant) 2 0.57 0.57 2.35 2.35 0.16 0.16 4.12 4.12 -6 -6 7 7 50 











4. Characteristics of Hedge Funds  
Table 3 provides summary statistics regarding some of the characteristics of hedge 
funds that are considered in this study.  In Panel A it is possible to infer that funds that 
are active tend to live longer than Drop reason funds. Additionally, the proportion of 
funds with HWM is higher for active than Drop reason funds. The results for the age 
and HWM variable are in line with the findings of Lee and Kim (2014) and Haghani 
(2014). Furthermore, the mean differences between the proportion of funds with 
Leverage, lockup period and Personal Capital are not statistically significant between 
active and graveyard funds. These conclusions hold for both failure methods. 
In Panel B it is possible to conclude that the average monthly RoR and AuM for the 
lifetime of active funds is significantly higher than the corresponding values for Drop 
reason hedge funds in the four time horizons considered (full lifetime of Drop reason 
funds and 1, 6 and 12 months before the fund stops reporting). Also, the average 
monthly RoR and AuM consistently decreases as the fund approaches its last reporting 
month. The same relation can also be found for the corresponding median values. These 
conclusions hold for the Real failure method as well.  
On the other hand, as the sample of funds approaches its last reporting month, the 
standard deviation of the average monthly RoR increases for both failure methods. 
Meanwhile, the standard deviation for the AuM increases for the Drop reason failure 
funds as we approach the last reporting month but not for the Real failure method. 
Table 2 - Continuation 














































































Real Failure 724 0.43 0.42 4.46 3.41 -0.39 -0.20 7.68 5.05 -13 -10 13 9 60 
Loser but not Real 
Failure 
 677  0.60 0.54  3.94 3.15  -0.26 -0.14  7.21 5.00  -11 -9  12 9  57 
Loser  1,401  0.51 0.48  4.21 3.29  -0.32 -0.17  7.45 5.02  -12 -9  12 9  59 
Not a Loser  1,764  0.90 0.77  3.77 2.92  -0.04 -0.05  7.68 5.28  -11 -8  13 9  62 




Analysis of the Characteristics of Hedge Funds 
The table categorizes failed funds according to both failure methods. Panel A also includes all 
of the funds considered in this analysis (“All Funds”). Age indicates the average lifetime 
period for each group of hedge funds in months. Lockup, HWM, Leveraged and Personal 
Capital represent the percentage of hedge funds in each group that have those characteristics.  
In Panel A the t-statistics for the mean differences between active and failed funds is indicated 
in the last column of each failure category. In Panel B we provide the mean, standard 
deviation and median for each covariate. Among the failed funds, there are statistics regarding 
the full lifetime of the fund (“Full Lifetime”) and statistics regarding the reported values 1, 6 
and 12 months before ceasing to report. The RoR and AuM are the average monthly reported 
values for each individual hedge fund. The AuM are in millions of US Dollars. The data was 
extracted from the TASS database for the time period of January 1995 to April 2013. The *, 
** and *** denote whether the (mean) differences between active and failed funds are 
statistically different for a significance level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 






















Age (months) 79 106 71 17.46*** 81 72 5.31*** 
Lockup (%) 37.0 37.6 36.8 0.4 37.1 36.6 0.23 
HWM (%) 75.5 81.3 73.7 4.46*** 76.5 72.1 2.34** 
Leveraged (%) 63.4 63.4 63.3 0.01 64.1 60.9 1.54 
Personal Capital (%) 32.95 34.2 32.6 0.81 32.9 33.2 0.13 
 
Panel B – RoR and AuM 
 
 






Failed Funds  
Active 
Funds 























RoR  Mean 0.8  0.7 *** 0.3 *** -0.2 *** -0.9 ***  0.8  0.4 *** -0.2*** -1.4 *** -3.3 *** 
Std Dev 0.6  0.9 4.7 5.0 7.7  0.8  0.8 4.5 4.6 10.6 
Median 0.8  0.6 0.5 0.2 -0.1  0.7  0.4 0.2 -0.5 -1.1 
  
 
    
       
AuM Mean 184  104 *** 134 *** 137 *** 120 ***  134  86 * 112 *** 93 *** 60 *** 
Std Dev 363  261 426 566 547  314  185 317 291 215 

















1. Risk Measures 
This study estimates different risk measures on a monthly basis using a rolling window 
of the last 60 months of historical returns reported by each hedge fund. Whenever 60 
months of data are not available, a minimum of 24 months is used. The risk measures 
considered in this analysis are the following: standard deviation (SD), semi deviation 
(SEM), value-at-risk (VaR), expected shortfall (ES) and tail risk (TR). We consider the 
same set of risk measures as the article of Liang and Park (2010) which performs a 
survival analysis on hedge funds while focusing mainly on the effects of the risk 
covariate. Additionally, Liang and Park (2007) also use these five risk measures in order 
to analyse the risk-return characteristics of hedge funds. Furthermore, several other 
authors have already used some of these risk measures in hedge fund literature. Lee and 
Kim (2014) use the ES in order to model the risk of failure of hedge funds while 
Malkiel and Saha (2005) and Brown, Goetzmann and Park (2001) use the SD as a the 
risk covariate in their survival analyses.  Bali, Gokcan and Liang (2007) analyse the risk 
return trade off of hedge funds and use the VaR in order to quantify risk.  
SD measures the deviation of each observed return from the mean return of the sample 
under analysis. The formula for this measure can be defined as follows: 
 
𝑆𝐷 = 𝜎 =  𝐸[ 𝑅𝑡 − 𝜇 2] , 
(1) 
where μ stands for the mean return of the sample and 𝑅𝑡   stands for the observed return 
in month t. 
Unlike SD, SEM takes only into account the deviation from the mean returns of the 
sample whenever they are negative. Therefore, by looking solely at the negative side of 
the distribution SEM is more appropriate for non-normal distributed returns, relatively 
to when returns are symmetrical (Liang and Park, 2007). This risk measure can be 
expressed as follows: 
 
𝑆𝐸𝑀 =  𝐸{𝑀𝑖𝑛[(𝑅𝑡 − 𝜇),0]2} 
 
(2) 
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The VaR measures the potential loss in a specific investment over a defined period for a 
certain significance level (α).6  In order to consider higher moments in the distribution 
of returns of hedge funds, the VaR is calculated taking into account the Cornish-Fisher 
expansion which incorporates skewness and kurtosis into the calculation.7 The Cornish-
Fisher expansion denoted by Ω 𝛼  and the VaR depicted in Equations (4) and (3), 
respectively, are calculated as defined by Liang and Park (2010).  
The ES is the expected amount of the loss that is greater or equal to the VaR. In this 
study the ES is calculated taking into account the VaR with the Cornish-Fisher 
expansion. Unlike the VaR that only looks at the biggest loss that can happen for a 
certain confidence level, the ES is able to tell us about the magnitude of the amount that 
is above that loss (Liang and Park, 2007). The equation for this risk measure can be 
defined as follows: 
 
𝐸𝑆 𝛼 = −E 𝑅𝑡   𝑅𝑡 ≤ − 𝑉𝑎𝑅 𝛼 ]  
(5) 
The TR measures the conditional standard deviation of the losses that are greater than 
the VaR. This measure can be seen as an alternative to the standard deviation and semi 
deviation whenever we only want to look at extremely low return observations. For 
example, Agarwal and Naik (2004) argue that TR is an important measure to take into 
account when an investor is building portfolios with hedge funds as it incorporates 
losses under extreme events which are normaly associated to downward market 
movements. Consequently, they find that ignoring the TR can potentiate higher losses 
during downward periods of the market such as financial crisis.  
 
                                                 
6 The VaR without the Cornish-Fisher expansion can be defined as follows: 𝑉𝑎𝑅′ 𝛼 = −(𝜇 + 𝑧(𝛼) × 𝜎) , 
where z(α) represents the critical value to the standard normal distribution. 
7 Liang and Park (2010) and Lee and Kim (2014) also perform survival analysis for hedge funds using 
risk measures that are adjusted for the Cornish-Fisher expansion. Liang and Park (2010) uses the same set 
of risk measures presented in this study while Lee and Kim (2014) focuses solely on the ES. 
 𝑉𝑎𝑅 𝛼 = −(𝜇 + Ω(𝛼) × 𝜎)  (3) 
Ω 𝛼 = 𝑧 𝛼 +
1
6
 𝑧 𝛼 2 − 1 × 𝑆 +
1
24










The TR is calculated taking into account the VaR with the Cornish-Fisher expansion 
and can be formulated as follows: 
𝑇𝑅 𝛼 =  E  𝑅𝑡 − 𝐸(𝑅𝑡) 
2 𝑅𝑡 ≤ − 𝑉𝑎𝑅 𝛼 ] 
 
(6) 
All of the relevant risk measures throughout this study were calculated for a 
significance level (α) of 5%. 
 
2. Survival Analysis 
2.1 Model Specification 
The survival analysis that is performed in this study focuses on the time between a 
hedge fund is incepted and a certain event occurs (in this case, the event is defined as 
the failure of the hedge fund).  
Let 𝑇∗  be a random variable related to the duration of a hedge fund and 𝐶 be the 
censoring time. Censoring is observed in this study either when the hedge fund is still 
alive at the end of the observation period (i.e., up to April 2013) or whenever a failure 
event occurs. The 𝛿  symbol denotes the event indicator that the fund failed and can be 
formulated as follows: 
 𝛿 =  𝐼 𝑇
∗   ≤  𝐶   (7) 
Furthermore, the duration variable that we observed ( 𝑇∗  ) denotes the time from the 
hedge fund inception until it fails, as described in Equation (8).  
 
𝑇 =  𝑚𝑖𝑛 (𝑇∗, 𝐶) 
 (8) 
We use calendar time through a chronological time scale that begins with the first 
observation in the study. Whenever funds are organised in calendar time all 
observations are arranged according to the time period under analysis i.e., time 0 is 
January 1995 and the last time period, time 𝑇∗  , is April 2013. The calendar time was 
incorporated into the analysis by using the counting process style as described by 
Therneau and Grambsch (2000). It is important to mention that whenever calendar time 
is used it allows for the control of calendar effects. This way, no crisis indicators are 
required in the model since the covariates are already isolated in time. Figure 2 
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Illustration of Calendar Times for Hedge Fund Failures 
Illustration of a set of funds arranged in calendar time. Time 0 corresponds to January 
1995 and the last time period, i.e., time T, corresponds to April 2013. The symbol in the 
end of the line  represents the time period when the failure event occurred. The 
symbol  indicates the fund has survived until the end of the analysis. 
 
 
In order to perform this survival analysis, an important aspect of this model is the 
hazard function, ℎ(𝑡) , which is defined as the instantaneous risk of a hedge fund failing 
at time 𝑡 taking into account that it was alive up until that time. Generically the hazard 




𝑃(𝑡 ≤ 𝑇 < 𝑡 + Δ 𝑇 ≥ 𝑡) ∕ Δ𝑡 
 
(9) 
According to Kiefer (1988), the hazard function provides a convenient definition of 
duration dependence, such that positive and negative duration dependences refer to 
increasing and decreasing hazards, respectively. 
The Cox Proportional Hazards Model is used in order to model the hazard function. 
This model can be formally written as follows: 
The 0 𝑡  is the baseline hazard function and corresponds to the probability of failure 
of a fund when all of the covariates have a value of zero (since 𝑒𝑥𝑝0 = 1 ). The 𝑋𝑖 
represents the vector of covariates for fund 𝑖  and 𝑋𝑖
𝑇  represents its corresponding 
transpose. Moreover, B represents the matrix of the regression parameters for each of 
 
ℎ 𝑡 ; 𝑋𝑖 = 0 𝑡  × exp 𝐵 𝑋𝑖






the covariates. Bearing this in mind, the exponent of the hazard function can be 
generically translated into the following equation: 
𝑋𝑖
𝑇  𝐵 =  𝛽𝑥1 × 𝑥𝑖 ,1 𝑡 +  𝛽𝑥2 × 𝑥𝑖 ,2 𝑡 + ⋯ +  𝛽𝑥𝑛 × 𝑥𝑖 ,𝑛 𝑡 + 𝛽𝑦1 × 𝑦𝑖 ,1 𝑡  + 𝛽𝑦2
× 𝑦𝑖 ,2 𝑡 + ⋯ +  𝛽𝑦𝑚 × 𝑦𝑖 ,𝑚 𝑡  
 
(11) 
The 𝑥𝑖,𝑛 𝑡  represents the value of the 𝑛
𝑡ℎ  time-varying covariate at time 𝑡 for fund 𝑖 
and the 𝛽𝑥𝑛   represents the regression parameter for the corresponding covariate. 
Meanwhile, 𝑦𝑖,𝑚 𝑡   represents the value of the 𝑚𝑡ℎ  fixed covariate at time 𝑡 for fund 𝑖 
and the 𝛽𝑦𝑚   represents the regression parameter for the corresponding covariate.8  
The time-varying covariates included in the model are the following: 
o  𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑡  , is the risk measure calculated in month 𝑡 as described in Section C.1; 
o  𝐴𝑣𝑔_𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛_1𝑌(𝑡) , is the average monthly RoR in the last 12 months, 
relatively to month t; 
o  𝐴𝑣𝑔_𝐴𝑈𝑀_1𝑌(𝑡) , is the average monthly reported AuM in the last 12 months, 
relatively to month t; 
o  𝑆𝑡𝑑_𝐴𝑈𝑀_1𝑌(𝑡)  , represents the standard deviation of the monthly reported 
AuM in the last 12 months, relatively to month t; 
o  𝐴𝑔𝑒(𝑡) , is the interval of time in months between the inception of the fund and 
month t. 
 
The fixed covariates included in the model are the following: 
o  𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑆𝑡𝑦𝑙𝑒𝑠  represents a set of categorical variables from 1 to 7 which 
indicate the investment style of the fund as reported in the TASS database (since 
there are eight investment styles considered in this analysis, the model considers 
seven categorical variables – this way, the Multi Strategy investment style is 
implicitly considered in the model whenever all of the seven categorical 
variables are equal to 0);9 
o  𝐻𝑊𝑀  is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the fund has a high water mark, 
otherwise it is equal to 0; 
                                                 
8 The set of covariates considered in this hazard function was selected accordingly to the article of Liang 
and Park (2010). 
9 See section B.1 for further details on all of the investment styles considered in this analysis. 
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o  𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑   is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the fund uses leverage, 
otherwise it is equal to 0; 
o  𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑢𝑝  is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the fund has a lockup period, 
otherwise it is equal to 0; 
o  𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙_𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙  is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the fund manager 
has invested his or her own personal capital, otherwise it is equal to 0; 
The set of covariates that are considered in this model have been used by several other 
authors in order to perform survival analyses on hedge fund failures. Liang and Park 
(2010) find that performance, size of the fund, Age, HWM and Lockup influence the 
risk of failure. Besides, the authors also consider Personal Capital as a predictor variable 
in their survival analysis. Moreover, Lee and Kim (2014) show empirical evidence that 
whether a hedge fund has leverage also affects its probability of failure. Haghani (2014) 
finds that certain investment styles, such as Convertible Arbitrage, Dedicated Short 
Bias, Equity Market Neutral or Global Macro, have a statistically significant impact on 
predicting hedge fund failure. Finally, Rouah (2006) shows that the standard deviation 
of the AuM also affects the risk of failure of hedge funds.  
In addition, it is important to mention that regarding the selection of the covariates of 
the model, Ackerman, McEnall, and Ravenscraft (1999) estimated the correlations 
between certain characteristics of hedge funds such as Age, AuM and Investment Styles 
and found that none of the correlations is large enough to raise issues of multi-
collinearity. 
Performing a survival analysis requires the testing of whether there is a constant 
relationship between the dependent variable and the explanatory variables of the model 
(this is called the assumption of proportional hazards). This assumption can be tested by 
examining plots of log-log survival vs. time for groups defined by various levels of the 
covariates. It is expected to obtain parallel curves in order to ensure that this assumption 
is valid. The proportional hazards assumption is also tested using the Schoenfeld 
residuals for each covariate and globally (Therneau and Grambsch 2000). 
Furthermore, since this study considers both fixed and time-varying covariates; 
extensions of the Cox Model are used for estimating the effects of covariates on the 
hazard function and allowing for non-proportional hazards. When time-varying 




for each unit 𝑖 in 𝑘𝑖  appropriate time intervals, such that each interval has a start and 
stop time; whether the event is observed or not.  Differently from fixed covariates, the 
time-dependent covariates change at different rates over given time intervals for 
different hedge funds. In this study the time-varying covariates are analysed on a 
monthly basis. 
The model analysed in this study assumes that the hazard is constant not over the whole 
period, but within certain specific intervals of time. Bearing this in mind, the study 
considers a regression with piecewise effects by introducing one breakpoint for the risk 
covariate in 2007. This way, two parameters for the risk covariate, 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑡  , were 
considered; depending on whether 𝑡 was between January 1995 and December 2006 
(𝛽𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘  [95−06] ) or between January 2007 and April 2013 (𝛽𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘  [07−13] ). By splitting this 
regression coefficient into two different time intervals, it is possible to analyse 
separately the relation between the hazard function and the risk covariate for these two 
periods of time – allowing for the evaluation of whether the effect of the risk covariate 
in the probability for a fund to fail has shifted.  
 
2.2 Estimating the Parameters of the Cox Model 
One of the major advantages of the Cox Model is that it introduces a process to estimate 
the regression parameters without being necessary to calculate the baseline hazard 
function, 0 𝑡  . The first step in this process is to calculate the conditional probability 
that fund 𝑖 fails at time 𝑇𝑖 rather than any other fund, taking into account it has survived 
until then. This probability is denoted by 𝐶𝑖 𝑇𝑖  and can be formally described as 
follows: 
𝐶𝑖 𝑇𝑖 =  
ℎ 𝑇𝑖 ;𝑋𝑖 





The 𝑅(𝑇𝑖)  represents the set of all funds that are at risk (i.e., have not failed yet) at time 
𝑇𝑖 . 
The next step is to calculate the partial likelihood function (PL) which is the product of 
the conditional probabilities of all of the observed failures. If I is the number of events 
of failure, the likelihood function can be formally described as follows:  
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Similarly to a logistic regression, the regression parameters of the hazard function can 
now be estimated by maximizing the logarithm of the partial likelihood function. 
Furthermore, standard errors of those parameters can also be obtained, which are useful 
in order to test for the statistical significance of whether the model parameters are 
different from zero or not.  
Furthermore, in the Cox Model, results are often presented as hazard ratios and they 
represent by how much does the risk of failure increases or decreases for a certain 
covariate. Equation (14) defines the hazard ratio (HR) as a function of the model 
parameters. 
𝐻𝑅 =  𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛽) 
 
(14) 
The process of estimation of the model parameters was performed through the use of 
SAS. 
 
D. Empirical Results 
 
1. Risk Profile of Hedge Funds 
This section illustrates the differences between the risk profiles of hedge funds that have 
failed relatively to active funds. Figure 3 plots the average expected shortfall of hedge 
funds in their last 24 months of reported performance for active and failed hedge funds 
according to the Drop reason failure. The figure presents this trend as if we were in 
December 2006 and April 2013. By dividing this analysis before and after 2007, it is 
possible to analyse whether the relation between the risk profiles of active vs. failed 
hedge funds in the last reporting months has changed or not. 
It is possible to notice that in the end of 2006 (Panel A of Figure 3), the risk profile of 
hedge funds that were about to fail was on average higher than for active funds in the 
last 24 months of reported performance. This result is similar to the article of Liang and 




2004. It is also possible to see that the average risk profile of failed hedge funds slightly 
increases as the last reporting month gets closer.  
Figure 3 
Risk Profile of Hedge Funds in the last 24 months – Drop Reason Failure 
The figure shows the evolution of the risk profile of hedge funds in the last 24 months of 
reported performance. For the funds that have failed the risk was calculated taking into account 
the last 24 months before ceasing to report to the TASS database. For the funds that are still 
active the risk was calculated taking into account the last 24 months of reported performance. 
The horizontal axis represents the number of months to go before ceasing to report. The vertical 
axis represents the risk measure under analysis, i.e., the expected shortfall with the Cornish-
Fisher expansion (ES). Panels A and B represent the statistics for the risk profile of hedge funds 
as if it was December 2006 and April 2013, respectively. The failure event of a hedge fund is 




Meanwhile, by looking at the risk profile trend for the period that goes up until 2013 
(Panel B of Figure 3), it is possible to see that there is a notorious change in the risk 
profile of hedge funds. As of April 2013, active hedge funds have had on average a 
higher risk profile relatively to failed funds. Although the risk profile of failed hedge 
funds tends to increase as the last reporting month gets closer, it never beats the average 
risk profile of active funds. 
The analysis presented in Figure 4 plots the average expected shortfall of hedge funds in 
their last 24 months of reported performance for active and failed hedge funds 
according to the Real failure criteria. 
In the end of 2006 (Panel A of Figure 4), the risk profile of funds that fulfil the Real 
failure criteria is on average higher than the one for active funds in the last 24 months of 
reported performance. However, in April 2013 (Panel B of Figure 4), the average risk 
profile of active funds only becomes statistically different from funds that fulfil the Real 
failure criteria in the last 2 to 4 months before ceasing to report to the TASS database 
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(depending on the risk measure that is considered). In general, the findings of Figure 3 
and Figure 4 suggest that there has been a shift in the relation between the average risk 
profiles of active vs. failed funds before and after the 2007. Results show that this shift 
is evident regardless of the failure method that is considered. 
 
Figure 4 
Risk Profile of Hedge Funds in the last 24 months – Real Failure Criteria 
The figure shows the evolution of the risk profile of hedge funds in the last 24 months of 
reported performance. For the funds that have failed the risk was calculated taking into account 
the last 24 months before ceasing to report to the TASS database. For the funds that are still 
active the risk was calculated taking into account the last 24 months of reported performance. 
The horizontal axis represents the number of months to go before ceasing to report. The vertical 
axis represents the risk measure under analysis, i.e., the expected shortfall with the Cornish-
Fisher expansion (ES). Panels A and B represent the statistics for the risk profile of hedge funds 
as if it was December 2006 and April 2013, respectively. In Panel B, the average ES between 
failed and active funds only becomes statistically different in the last 3 months before the last 





It is also important to mention that the risk profile analysis presented in Figure 3 and 
Figure 4 was performed for all of the risk measures considered in this study (SD, SEM, 
VaR, ES and TR), with and without the Cornish-Fisher expansion. The results confirm 
that the findings are robust regardless of the risk measure that is used.  
 
2. Survival Analysis 
This section presents the results of the survival analysis. Table 4 shows the estimates of 
the model parameters as well as the hazard ratios for each of the covariates that were 




panel of Table 4, one for each risk measure. The failure event considered in Panel A is 





Results for the Survival Analysis of Hedge Funds 
The table provides the estimated parameters (β) and the hazard ratios for the survival analysis of 
hedge funds from January 1995 to April 2013. There are 5 regressions considered in each panel 
of this table; one for each risk measure. The model considers two risk measure covariates for 
each of the two time periods (i.e., 1995-2004 and 2005-2013). Besides the two risk measures, 
15 additional covariates (including the investment styles) are also considered in this model as 
controlling variables. The hazard ratio is the exponential of the corresponding coefficient and 
represents by how much does the risk of failure increases or decreases. The VaR, ES and TR 
are calculated with the Cornish-Fisher expansion. The values in bold correspond to the 
estimated coefficients for the risk measures that are negative and statistically significant. In 
Panel A the failure event is defined according to the Drop reason failure while in Panel B 
it is defined according to the Real failure criteria. The *, ** and *** denote whether the 
estimated parameters are statistically significant for a 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A - Failure Event: Drop Reason Failure 
 
 SD  SEM  VaR  ES  TR 

















































































Risk [95-06]  0.06*** 1.07  0.1*** 1.11  0.05*** 1.05  0.04*** 1.04  0.04*** 1.04 
Risk [07-13]  -0.11*** 0.90  -0.16*** 0.86  -0.06*** 0.95  -0.03*** 0.97  -0.03*** 0.97 
Avg Return 1Y  -0.27*** 0.77  -0.27*** 0.76  -0.27*** 0.77  -0.26*** 0.77  -0.26*** 0.77 
Avg AUM 1Y  -0.04*** 0.97  -0.04*** 0.96  -0.04*** 0.97  -0.03*** 0.97  -0.03*** 0.97 
Std AUM 1Y  0.04*** 1.04  0.04*** 1.05  0.04*** 1.05  0.04*** 1.05  0.04*** 1.04 
Age  0.01 1.01  0.01* 1.01  0.01* 1.01  0.01* 1.01  0.01** 1.01 
HWM  -0.24*** 0.79  -0.24*** 0.79  -0.25*** 0.78  -0.24*** 0.78  -0.24*** 0.79 
Personal Capital  -0.04 0.96  -0.04 0.96  -0.04 0.96  -0.04 0.96  -0.04 0.96 
Leveraged  0.06 1.06  0.06 1.06  0.06 1.06  0.04 1.05  0.05 1.05 
Lockup  0.03 1.04  0.04 1.04  0.04 1.04  0.03 1.03  0.03 1.03 
Convertible Arbitrage  0.33*** 1.40  0.34*** 1.41  0.36*** 1.44  0.38*** 1.46  0.37*** 1.45 
Dedicated Short Bias  0.13 1.14  0.09 1.10  0.08 1.08  -0.06 0.94  -0.05 0.95 
Equity Market Neutral  0.49*** 1.63  0.49*** 1.63  0.51*** 1.67  0.52*** 1.68  0.51*** 1.67 
Event Driven  0.33*** 1.38  0.33*** 1.39  0.34*** 1.41  0.34*** 1.40  0.34*** 1.40 
Fixed Income Arbitrage  0.3*** 1.34  0.29*** 1.34  0.32*** 1.38  0.32*** 1.37  0.31*** 1.37 
Global Macro  0.3*** 1.35  0.29*** 1.34  0.27*** 1.31  0.25** 1.29  0.26*** 1.29 
Long/Short Equity Hedge  0.22*** 1.25  0.22*** 1.25  0.22*** 1.25  0.19*** 1.21  0.19*** 1.21 
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Table 4 - Continuation 
Panel B - Failure Event: Real failure criteria 
 
 SD  SEM  VAR  ES  TR 





















































































Risk [95-06]  0.02 1.02  0.02 1.02  0.03** 1.03  0.03*** 1.03  0.03*** 1.03 
Risk [07-13]  -0.18*** 0.83  -0.26*** 0.77  -0.07*** 0.93  -0.04*** 0.96  -0.04*** 0.96 
Avg Return 1Y  -0.5*** 0.61  -0.52*** 0.60  -0.48*** 0.62  -0.46*** 0.63  -0.46*** 0.63 
Avg AUM 1Y  -0.11*** 0.90  -0.11*** 0.90  -0.11*** 0.90  -0.11*** 0.90  -0.11*** 0.90 
Std AUM 1Y  0.04 1.04  0.05 1.05  0.04 1.04  0.05 1.05  0.05 1.05 
Age  0.02** 1.02  0.02** 1.03  0.02** 1.02  0.03** 1.03  0.03*** 1.03 
HWM  -0.19** 0.83  -0.2** 0.82  -0.22** 0.80  -0.22** 0.81  -0.21** 0.81 
Personal Capital  0.01 1.01  0.01 1.01  < 0.01 1.01  0.02 1.02  0.02 1.02 
Leveraged  -0.03 0.97  -0.03 0.97  -0.05 0.95  -0.06 0.94  -0.06 0.94 
Lockup  0.05 1.05  0.05 1.06  0.05 1.05  0.04 1.04  0.03 1.03 
Convertible Arbitrage  0.46** 1.59  0.47** 1.61  0.54** 1.71  0.5** 1.65  0.49** 1.63 
Dedicated Short Bias  0.13 1.13  0.06 1.07  0.08 1.09  -0.1 0.90  -0.09 0.92 
Equity Market Neutral  0.77*** 2.15  0.77*** 2.17  0.86*** 2.36  0.84*** 2.33  0.83*** 2.30 
Event Driven  0.01 1.01  0.03 1.03  0.1 1.10  0.05 1.06  0.05 1.05 
Fixed Income Arbitrage  0.45** 1.56  0.46** 1.58  0.56*** 1.76  0.54*** 1.72  0.53** 1.70 
Global Macro  0.52*** 1.68  0.5*** 1.65  0.48*** 1.62  0.43** 1.54  0.43** 1.54 
Long/Short Equity Hedge  0.37*** 1.44  0.36*** 1.43  0.36*** 1.44  0.28** 1.33  0.29** 1.33 
 
It is possible to infer that between 1995 and 2006 there is a positive and significant 
relationship between the level of risk taken by a fund and its probability of a Drop 
reason failure. In other words, the more risk a fund takes, the more likely it will be for a 
Drop reason failure to occur. This result is evident by looking at the results of the 
parameter Risk [95-06] in Panel A of Table 4. Furthermore, if the Real failure method is 
considered, the results for the risk parameter between 1995 and 2006 are also positive. 
Nonetheless, whenever the Real failure method is considered, the SD and the SEM lose 
their explanatory power in predicting hedge fund failure. Meanwhile, the VaR, ES and 
TR remain statistically significant parameters for a 1% level. This result can be seen by 
looking at the results of the parameter Risk [95-06] in Panel B of Table 4. Converging 
with these results, Liang and Park (2010) and Lee and Kim (2014) also show empirical 
evidence that there is a positive relation between risk and the probability of failure. 
Furthermore Liang and Park (2010) also show that the SD and the SEM do not have 




On the other hand, if we consider the time period between 2007 and 2013, the results of 
the risk parameter become negative and statistically significant for all of the risk 
measures and for both failure methods. These findings are shown by the results of the 
estimated parameter Risk [07-13] in Panels A and B of Table 4. Therefore, it is possible to 
conclude that before 2007 higher risk levels were associated with riskier funds and from 
2007 onwards this relation inverted. This is a new finding in hedge fund literature since 
no previous authors have ever presented empirical evidence suggesting the existence of 
this shift in the relation between risk and failure. 
Furthermore, it is possible to quantify by how much a change in the risk level of a 
hedge fund affects its probability of failure through the interpretation of the hazard 
ratios depicted in Table 4.10 For example, during the period between 1995 and 2006, if 
the ES of a hedge fund increased by one unit, it meant the risk of occurrence of a Real 
failure would grow by 3%. This finding is evident by looking at the results of the hazard 
ratio for the parameter Risk [95-06] in Panel B of Table 4. On the other hand, having a 
hazard ratio below 1 implies the existence of an inverse relation between the covariate 
and the risk of failure. Hence, for the period between 2007 and 2013, an increase of one 
unit in the ES will reduce the probability of a Real failure by 4%. This finding is evident 
by looking at the results of the hazard ratio for the parameter Risk [07-13] in Panel B of 
Table 4. 
Ben-David, Franzoni and Moussawi (2012) find that, during the Global Financial Crisis, 
more high- than low-volatility stocks were sold by hedge funds due to the fact that high-
volatility positions required a greater amount of margins. Therefore, it is possible to 
infer that funds that were faced with financial constraints attempted to decrease their 
risk profile. Bearing this in mind it is possible to hypothesize that, even though these 
“stressed” funds were able to adopt a lower risk profile, ultimately they were incapable 
of overcoming their financial limitations, thus failing. On the other hand, funds that did 
not experience financial constraints during the Global Financial Crisis were able to 
maintain their previous risk levels. This way, the response of hedge funds to the Global 
Financial Crisis could have caused a shift in the dynamics between risk and failure. It is 
important to mention that this is a hypothetical reason for the occurrence of this shift 
                                                 
10 If the value of a certain covariate increases by one unit, and the hazard ratio of that covariate is HR, the 
percentage change in the risk of failure of the hedge fund is given by: (𝐻𝑅 − 1) × 100 . 
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and that further research about the portfolio allocation of hedge funds during this period 
could potentially shed a light on this matter.  
Regarding the remaining covariates, results show the last year performance and size of 
the fund decrease the risk of failure of hedge funds. In other words, funds that perform 
better and have more AuM are less likely to fail relatively to funds that have a lower 
performance and are smaller in size. This conclusion can be taken from the estimated 
parameters for the Avg Return 1Y and Avg AUM 1Y which are always negative and 
statistically significant for a 1% level for both failure events considered in the analysis. 
In line with these results are the findings of Liang and Park (2010), Haghani (2014) and 
Lee and Kim (2014) who also perform a survival analysis and show negative 
coefficients for the covariates of the RoR and the AuM of hedge funds.  
Furthermore, it is also possible to see that having a HWM also reduces the risk of 
failure. Liang and Park (2010) show similar results and argue that having a HWM 
provision serves as a manager quality signal since only good fund managers can afford 
to impose this condition. Additionally, Liang (1999) argues that funds with HWM 
significantly outperform those without. Moreover, the age covariate is associated with a 
positive coefficient which diverges from the findings of Liang and Park (2010) by 
suggesting older funds are more likely to fail.  
All of the estimated parameters for the investment style covariates are statistically 
significant with the exception of the Dedicated Short Bias investment style for both 
panels of Table 4 and the Event Driven investment style for Panel B. These findings 
suggest that generally, the investment style adopted by a fund influences its risk of 
failure which is related with the fact that the overall performance of hedge funds varies 
according to its investment style. This idea can be supported by the findings of Brown 
and Goetzmann (2003) who argue that differences in investment style contribute for 
about 20 per cent of the cross-sectional variability in hedge funds performance. 
Moreover, Liang and Park (2010) and Haghani (2014) also find that certain investment 
styles have explanatory power in predicting the hedge fund failure. 
On the other hand, Table 4 suggests that the Std AUM 1 Y, Personal Capital, Leveraged 
and Lockup parameters are not statistically significant in predicting hedge fund failure. 
The results for these three parameters go in line with the article of Liang and Park 




significant factor in order to determine the risk of failure of hedge funds. Additionally, 
Lee and Kim (2014) find a non-statically significant parameter for the lockup period as 
well.  
 
3. Robustness Checks 
The present study considered several alternative survival analysis models by 
introducing various piecewise effects throughout time for the risk parameter in order to 
assess in which year the shift in the risk relationship occurred. The findings presented in 
Appendix 1 support the hypothesis that the risk parameter only became systematically 
negative for all of the risk measures from January 2007 onwards and that the turning 
point was indeed 2007, rather than in any other year. It also shows empirical evidence 
suggesting that the negative relation still holds for the period between 2011 and 2013. 
Furthermore, the same analysis was performed only considering funds that stopped 
reporting due to “Liquidation” and “Fund no longer reporting”, as specified by the Drop 
reasons provided in the TASS database. The purpose of this alternative analysis is to 
examine whether if considering only some of the drop reasons changes our conclusions 
regarding the shift in the relation between risk and failure. The results presented in 
Appendix 1 confirm that the findings are robust regardless of whether all of the drop 
reasons are considered or not. 
Moreover, as an alternative to the return covariate described in the methodology, i.e., 
𝐴𝑣𝑔_𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛_1𝑌(𝑡) , this survival analysis was also performed using the actual return of 
month t, i.e., 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛(𝑡) , which is the return covariate that is used in the article of Lee 
and Kim (2014) in order to predict hedge fund failure. The results presented in 
Appendix 1 confirm that the findings are robust regardless of the return covariate that is 
used in the hazard function. 
Additionally, the survival analysis was also performed for the VaR, ES and TR without 
the Cornish-Fisher expansion. The results confirm that the findings are robust regardless 
of whether the Cornish-Fisher expansion is considered or not. 
 
 




The major contribution of this study is the introduction of a survival analysis to model 
hedge fund failures while incorporating piecewise effects for the risk covariate. The 
proposed model was able to examine whether lower risk levels effectively translate into 
a decrease in the risk of failure of hedge funds across different time periods. Although 
in previous years this relationship was true, empirical evidence presented in this study 
shows that between 2007 and 2013 increasing risk levels are linked to lower 
probabilities of failure.  
Furthermore, the present study uses an additional method to categorize a fund as a 
failure.  This alternative method aimed to reduce the existence of selection biases 
associated to the fact that fund managers can voluntarily stop reporting performance to 
the TASS database for other reasons than failure. Empirical evidence shows that the 
negative relation between the risk level and the probability of failure still holds for this 
alternative method. For that reason, these results indicate that the shift in the relation is 
not a consequence of this specific type of selection bias. 
Further research about this topic could potentially shed a light on the relation between 
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Appendix 1. Robustness Checks 
The purpose of this appendix is to present the results of the risk parameters for 
alternative models and datasets in order to show that the shift in the risk relation 
occurred in 2007, rather than in any other year. 
Table A.1 presents the results of the risk measure parameters for six different models; 
each one of them considers a different set of breakpoints for different time intervals. 
Model 1 considers three breakpoints for the time periods of [95-06], [07-10] and [11-
13]. Model 2 considers four breakpoints for the time periods of [95-99], [99-04], [05-
06] and [07-13]. Model 3 considers four breakpoints for the time periods of [95-00], 
[01-06], [07-08] and [09-13]. Model 4 considers three breakpoints for the time periods 
of [95-06], [07-09] and [10-13]. Model 5 considers two breakpoints for the time periods 
of [95-06] and [07-13]. Model 6 does not consider any breakpoints and the risk measure 
parameter regards the whole time period under analysis, i.e., [95-13].  
Panel A of Table A.1 uses the same set of covariates as described in Section C.2, i.e., 
the standard model. The dataset is the same as the one described in section B.1, i.e., the 
standard dataset. 
The Panel B of Table A.1 uses the standard model while considering an alternative 
dataset of funds. In this case only funds that failed according to the drop reasons “Fund 
liquidated” and “Unable to contact fund” were considered in the analysis.  
The Panel C of Table A.1 uses the standard dataset while considering an alternative 
model where the return covariate that is used in the analysis is the actual return of 
month 𝑡 , i.e., 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛(𝑡) . 
The results depicted in Table A.1 support the hypothesis that the risk parameter only 
became systematically negative for all of the risk measures from January 2007 onwards 
and that the turning point was indeed 2007. It is also possible to infer that the negative 
relation still holds after 2007 since the risk parameter for the time interval between 
January 2011 and April 2013 is still negative for all of the different models and datasets 
that were considered. 




Models with Multiple Breakpoints across Time 
The table provides the parameter estimates of the risk measure covariate for the survival analysis of hedge funds from January 1995 to April 2013. Panel A 
shows the results of the standard dataset and the standard model. Panel B regards the standard model while considering only the following drop reasons: 
“Fund Liquidated” and “Unable to contact Fund”. In Panel C an alternative model where the return covariate is the actual return of month  is used while 
considering the standard dataset. Each of the six models considers different breakpoints for the risk measure parameters for different time intervals. Besides 
the results for the risk measure covariates depicted in this table, the model also considers 15 additional covariates (including the investment styles) which 
constitute controlling variables as described in see section C.2. The values in bold correspond to the estimated parameters that are negative. The *, ** and *** 
denote whether the estimated parameters are statistically significant for a 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A – Standard Model and Dataset 





SD SEM VAR ES TR 
 




0.064*** 0.102*** 0.046*** 0.039*** 0.037*** 
 
0.008 0.01 0.024** 0.029*** 0.025*** 
Risk [07-10] 
 
-0.103*** -0.15*** -0.056*** -0.028*** -0.03*** 
 
-0.222*** -0.301*** -0.086*** -0.045*** -0.049*** 
Risk [11-13] 
 
-0.119*** -0.17*** -0.051*** -0.028*** -0.034*** 
 




0.123*** 0.187*** 0.067** 0.047*** 0.049*** 
 
0.112 0.158 0.067 0.064** 0.061** 
Risk [99-04] 
 
0.053*** 0.088*** 0.037*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 
 
0.004 0.002 0.014 0.023** 0.022** 
Risk [05-06] 
 
0.075*** 0.114*** 0.058*** 0.044*** 0.039*** 
 
0.04 0.055 0.057*** 0.037*** 0.029*** 
Risk [07-13] 
 
-0.107*** -0.155*** -0.055*** -0.028*** -0.031*** 
 




0.074*** 0.111*** 0.045*** 0.039*** 0.038*** 
 
0.025 0.035 0.026 0.033*** 0.03** 
Risk [01-06] 
 
0.064*** 0.105*** 0.049*** 0.041*** 0.038*** 
 
0.017 0.025 0.031** 0.032*** 0.027*** 
Risk [07-08] 
 
-0.059*** -0.083*** -0.032*** -0.008 -0.01** 
 
-0.166*** -0.223*** -0.069*** -0.025*** -0.028*** 
Risk [09-13] 
 
-0.137*** -0.201*** -0.064*** -0.042*** -0.046*** 
 




0.061*** 0.097*** 0.044*** 0.039*** 0.037*** 
 
-0.003 -0.01 0.02* 0.027*** 0.023*** 
Risk [07-09] 
 
-0.125*** -0.177*** -0.065*** -0.034*** -0.035*** 
 
-0.267*** -0.357*** -0.097*** -0.051*** -0.054*** 
Risk [10-13] 
 
-0.088*** -0.131*** -0.04*** -0.021*** -0.026*** 
 




0.063*** 0.101*** 0.046*** 0.039*** 0.037*** 
 
0.017 0.022 0.029** 0.031*** 0.027*** 
Risk [07-13] 
 
-0.107*** -0.155*** -0.055*** -0.028*** -0.031*** 
 
-0.184*** -0.259*** -0.073*** -0.039*** -0.043*** 
Model 6 Risk [95-13] 
 
-0.015* -0.032*** -0.015*** -0.002 -0.003 
 
-0.081*** -0.137*** -0.046*** -0.021*** -0.023*** 
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Table A.1 – Continuation 
Panel B – Standard Model and Alternative Dataset (only for the drop reasons: “Fund Liquidated” and “Unable to contact Fund”) 





SD SEM VAR ES TR 
 




0.044*** 0.069*** 0.01 0.021** 0.031*** 
 
-0.018 -0.027 0.01 0.021** 0.035*** 
Risk [07-10] 
 
-0.141*** -0.202*** -0.082*** -0.042*** -0.039*** 
 
-0.216*** -0.294*** -0.082*** -0.042*** -0.03*** 
Risk [11-13] 
 
-0.167*** -0.229*** -0.054*** -0.04*** -0.045*** 
 




0.09** 0.132** 0.055 0.067* 0.045** 
 
0.038 0.086 0.055 0.067* 0.041** 
Risk [99-02] 
 
0.031** 0.053*** < 0.001 0.014 0.029*** 
 
-0.025 -0.039 < 0.001 0.014 0.032*** 
Risk [05-06] 
 
0.059*** 0.088*** 0.039** 0.027** 0.033*** 
 
0.007 0.007 0.039** 0.027** 0.037*** 
Risk [07-13] 
 
-0.148*** -0.209*** -0.075*** -0.042*** -0.04*** 
 




0.051*** 0.076*** 0.014 0.025* 0.033*** 
 
-0.004 -0.002 0.014 0.025* 0.035*** 
Risk [01-06] 
 
0.045*** 0.075*** 0.015 0.021** 0.033*** 
 
-0.013 -0.02 0.015 0.021** 0.036*** 
Risk [07-08] 
 
-0.08*** -0.113*** -0.063*** -0.023*** -0.013** 
 
-0.164*** -0.221*** -0.063*** -0.023*** -0.006 
Risk [09-13] 
 
-0.194*** -0.276*** -0.08*** -0.069*** -0.063*** 
 




0.04*** 0.065*** 0.006 0.019** 0.031*** 
 
-0.029 -0.046 0.006 0.019** 0.034*** 
Risk [07-09] 
 
-0.165*** -0.225*** -0.093*** -0.046*** -0.04*** 
 
-0.262*** -0.351*** -0.093*** -0.046*** -0.032*** 
Risk [10-13] 
 
-0.129*** -0.189*** -0.04*** -0.032*** -0.04*** 
 




0.043*** 0.068*** 0.013 0.021** 0.031*** 
 
-0.015 -0.023 0.013 0.021** 0.034*** 
Risk [07-13] 
 
-0.148*** -0.209*** -0.075*** -0.041*** -0.04*** 
 
-0.203*** -0.28*** -0.075*** -0.041*** -0.03*** 
Model 6 Risk [95-13] 
 
-0.033*** -0.06*** -0.049*** -0.022*** -0.008** 
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Table A.1 – Continuation 
Panel C – Alternative Model (the return covariate is substituted for the actual return of month t) and Standard Dataset 





SD SEM VAR ES TR 
 




0.072*** 0.118 0.064*** 0.042*** 0.036*** 
 
0.091*** 0.152 0.091*** 0.049*** 0.039*** 
Risk [07-10] 
 
-0.073*** -0.102 -0.026*** -0.016*** -0.02*** 
 
-0.063*** -0.074*** 0.003 -0.016** -0.024*** 
Risk [11-13] 
 
-0.119*** -0.169 -0.048*** -0.029*** -0.038*** 
 




0.121*** 0.204*** 0.095*** 0.051*** 0.049*** 
 
0.156** 0.285*** 0.15*** 0.082*** 0.071*** 
Risk [99-02] 
 
0.077*** 0.13 0.066*** 0.041*** 0.037*** 
 
0.1*** 0.167 0.091*** 0.048*** 0.041*** 
Risk [05-06] 
 
0.06*** 0.094 0.057*** 0.042*** 0.034*** 
 
0.063** 0.109*** 0.088*** 0.047*** 0.033*** 
Risk [07-13] 
 
-0.086*** -0.12 -0.032*** -0.019*** -0.024*** 
 




0.065*** 0.103 0.054*** 0.036*** 0.031*** 
 
0.061** 0.1** 0.064*** 0.032*** 0.023** 
Risk [01-06] 
 
0.078*** 0.132 0.07*** 0.046*** 0.041*** 
 
0.106*** 0.186 0.106*** 0.058*** 0.049*** 
Risk [07-08] 
 
-0.038** -0.047** -0.002 -0.004 -0.009* 
 
-0.019 -0.016 0.027** -0.009 -0.015* 
Risk [09-13] 
 
-0.114*** -0.164 -0.046*** -0.032*** -0.038*** 
 




0.073*** 0.119 0.064*** 0.042*** 0.037*** 
 
0.092*** 0.155 0.092*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 
Risk [07-09] 
 
-0.07*** -0.093 -0.023*** -0.014*** -0.018*** 
 
-0.047** -0.053* 0.01 -0.012* -0.02*** 
Risk [10-13] 
 
-0.103*** -0.152 -0.043*** -0.027*** -0.034*** 
 




0.071*** 0.117 0.063*** 0.042*** 0.036*** 
 
0.091*** 0.151 0.091*** 0.049*** 0.039*** 
Risk [07-13] 
 
-0.086*** -0.12 -0.032*** -0.019*** -0.024*** 
 
-0.065*** -0.082*** -0.002 -0.016*** -0.024*** 
Model 6 Risk [95-13] 
 
-0.004 -0.008 0.007 0.004 < 0.001 
 
0.006 0.011 0.03*** 0.004 -0.004 
 
 
